Abstract-Critical Infrastructures (CIs) use Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for remote control and monitoring. Sophisticated security measures are needed to address malicious intrusions, which are steadily increasing in number and variety due to the massive spread of connectivity and standardisation of open SCADA protocols. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) cannot detect attacks that are not already present in their databases. Therefore, in this paper, we assess Machine Learning (ML) for intrusion detection in SCADA systems using a real data set collected from a gas pipeline system and provided by the Mississippi State University (MSU). The contribution of this paper is two-fold: 1) The evaluation of four techniques for missing data estimation and two techniques for data normalization, 2) The performances of Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF) are assessed in terms of accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score for intrusion detection. Two cases are differentiated: binary and categorical classifications. Our experiments reveal that RF detect intrusions effectively, with an F1 score of respectively > 99%.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are commonly used by Critical Infrastructures (CIs) or industries which are vital to citizens' daily lives and countries' economies. It includes oil pipelines, water treatment, and chemical manufacturing plants to name but a few. Historically, SCADA systems implemented a security principle known as air gap, a strategy that physically isolates the control network from the rest of the network, including the Internet. True isolation, however, is difficult in a real-world environment. First, true isolation may lead to outdated software [1] , [2] . Without connectivity to the Internet, the software cannot easily receive security updates from the vendor. Second, true isolation is hard to implement since CI is often geographically distributed. Besides the air gap principle, SCADA systems have made use of proprietary software, hardware, and communication protocols which have provided a false sense of security through obscurity [1] .
Nowadays, the use of standardized communications protocols has enabled the integration of SCADA systems with the Internet and corporate networks. Given this new context, SCADA systems are prone to numerous threats due to their large deployment areas, distributed operating mode and growing interconnectivity [3] . Indeed, the widespread use of the TCP/IP stack has led to the its adoption in SCADA systems. Modicom Communication Bus (Modbus) TCP, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) [4] , and IEC 60870-5-104 are the main communication protocols used. These protocols were designed over twenty years ago and are known to be highly vulnerable to simple network attacks [5] , [6] . Given this alarming situation, the EU has funded several research project such as ATENA [7] to tackle anomaly detection in SCADA systems.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are the de-facto protection standard for any IT system. The detection of intrusions with a traditional IDS requires a database containing signatures of different attacks, each signature corresponding to a specific attack and its characteristics. The main disadvantage of this technique is the need for human intervention to analyse vulnerabilities and threats to create unique signatures. Consequently, Machine Learnings (MLs) techniques are a good candidate able to develop anomaly detection algorithms that can learn about normal behaviour and autonomously adapt to variations, acting without being pre-programmed or provided with an explicit pattern [8] .
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the SCADA architecture. While discussing the technical background, we also highlight the vulnerabilities that exist in SCADA protocols.
A. SCADA Architecture
Typically, SCADA systems consist of (1) field instrument devices for sensing conditions of the CI (power level, pressure, throughput, etc.); (2) operating equipment such as valves, pumps, etc. controlled by actuators; (3) field local processors such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) that communicate with field instrument devices and operating equipment; and finally (4) the Human Machine Interface (HMI) that acts as a central controller and monitoring host. To operate properly in a synchronized manner, these different components must communicate. While short-range communications are used to establish links between local processors, instrument devices and operating equipments, long-range communications are used to connect PLCs and RTUs with the HMI or the Master Terminal Unit (MTU).
B. Attack Vectors on SCADA
As described in Section I, adversaries often can reach the control system from the Internet, because the air gap principle is no longer not applicable in modern SCADA networks [1] .
Most of these networks are geographically distributed. Hence, they need to be connected to the HMI, either via Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), or leased lines. All of these connections can be used to gain access to the control system.
After an attacker has gained access to the network, there are three attack vectors against a SCADA protocol: First, by exploiting vendor-specific implementation faults like memorycorruption bugs; second, by exploiting weaknesses in the infrastructure like missing or inadequate firewall rules; and third, by exploiting protocol-specific weaknesses in the specification. In this paper, we focus on the third attack vector. An attacker wanting to exploit SCADA protocol weaknesses, has four general attacks to choose from [9] : 1) Interception: An attacker is able to analyse the network traffic and gather information about the network infrastructure; 2) Interruption: An attacker intercepts packets and does not forward them to the next node; 3) Modification: The attacker is a man-in-the-middle (MitM) modifying packets in a network stream; 4) Fabrication: An attacker is able to inject packets into the network. All four attacks can target the HMI, the network infrastructure itself, or the RTU/PLC.
III. ANOMALY DETECTION IN SCADA SYSTEMS: DATA SET AND METHODOLOGY
To investigate the merits of the ML-based techniques for anomaly detection in SCADA systems, a real-world gas pipeline data set is used for anomaly detection in our experiments. We now describe the data set briefly, as well as the different steps of our methodology for anomaly detection.
A. The Gas Pipeline Data Set
The SCADA data set used in this work is hosted on the Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Attack Data Sets [10] website. The real-world raw data was generated using a gas pipeline system provided by the Mississippi State University (MSU)'s in-house SCADA lab. It contains a total of 274,628 instances. The data set is used to create ML models once it has been pre-processed. It contains 20 features from Modbus RTU packets, three different types of labels and also pure raw data, which is provided to aid in the pre-processing stage. We refer interesting readers to [11] in which the authors describe the details of the data set and also the methodology for the data set collection.
As discussed in Section I, SCADA systems are a focus of cyber-attacks. The MSU's in-house SCADA lab used seven categories of attacks which were previously developed in Gao's research [12] to provide a broader perspective on the attacks that SCADA systems may suffer.
These attacks, set out in the Table I , are the result of one or a series of external malicious activities through Modbus RTU packets. The attacks include a description of the attacks, a category and a attack type according to our attack model in section II-B.
B. Methodology
Developing an ML-based IDS for intrusion detection in SCADA systems requires the steps illustrated in Figure 1 . In some cases attribute values ("features") were missing from the data set used in our experiments. As these values are useful in prediction modelling, the first phase of our approach cleans and transforms the data to eliminate incomplete records. Next, to train our data, it was fundamental to follow the Holdout method and split each of the sixteen data sets into training, validation and test sets containing respectively 60% (164,776 instances), 20% (54,926 instances) and 20% (54,926 instances) of the observations. The validation set and the test set were respectively pre-processed based on the statistics obtained from the training set and the combined training set and validation set. Because parameters of prior distribution, called hyperparameters, may significantly impact the performance of ML methods, we performed a hyperparameter search for the selected ML algorithms. Given that the data set is comprised of normal traffic and variants of attack types, we distinguish two classifiers: binary classification (normal, anomaly) and sevencategory classification (see attacks depicted in Table I ).
1) Data Cleaning:
We observed that many feature values were missing or non-existent. The Table II depicts the first three rows of the data set in Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF). Addr, funct and c/r refer respectively to the address, function and command response features. Table II , presents three different types of payloads where data is missing: 1) All values are missing or nonexistent; 2) only the pressure measurement is present; and 3) all values except the pressure measurement are present. To handle the feature values in the data set that do not have any representation or meaning, we used four techniques:
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) can find the best number k of Gaussian distributions needed to cluster our data. To this end, the algorithm finds the best mean or centre, μ and variance σ of the Gaussian distributions that best separate our data. K-means allows us to find the best number k of clusters by computing the Euclidean distance between the given samples and a pre-assigned centroid point. These latter are assigned to a certain cluster and updated until convergence on the best separation of the data. In both GMM and K-means techniques, the first payload type were considered as cluster k = 0, and the second and third payload types were be assigned to k number of clusters defined by the elbow method. This method determined the best number of clusters based on the cost function or distortion:
Lower values of j determine a preferable number k of clusters and thus, better data separation. With this strategy, payloads are classified into k clusters, which are represented in the pre-processed data as a one-hot encoded notation. One hot encoding is a process of converting categorical variables into form more suitable for ML algorithms. 
where x is a feature value, μ is the mean, and σ is the standard deviation. Performing this pre-processing strategy ensures the minimization of the sample deviations from the mean. The second method is min-max approach, which consists of finding the minimum and maximum value from a given feature and normalizing the feature values between 0 and 1. Hence,
where x i is a feature value, min(x) and max(x) are the minimum and maximum values calculated from the overall feature values.
3) Hyperparameter Search:
In a Support Vector Machine (SVM), the hyperparameters C and γ must be correctly set for each of the sixteen data sets. Hence, we performed a random search to determine the best hyperparameters for our models. Although grid search and manual search are the most widely used techniques for hyperparameter optimization, it has been empirically and theoretically demonstrated that randomly chosen tests are more efficient [13] .
For each of the sixteen pre-processed data sets, we ran thirty different prediction trials over the corresponding validation set, during the hyperparameter search. The seven most notable results are analyzed to investigate how the algorithms converge to a good result after the best hyperparameters are found. Due to the long training time of SVMs, we used only 25% from the entire data set.
In Random Forest (RF), the hyperparameters number of estimators and maximum depth of the trees must be correctly set for each of the sixteen data sets. Once again, we performed a random search, through thirty different prediction trials, to define the best hyperparameters for these models.
4) Classification:
In this step, models are created with the aim of classifying novel observations on a set of predefined classes. If only two possible classes exist, then it is called binary classification. In contrast, if more than two classes are differentiated, it is called multi-class classification. In the context of this work, a classification task is performed to correctly classify benign and malicious packets. The trained model output would be 0 or 1, for a binary classification approach and from 0 to n classes', for a multi-class classification approach.
IV. DETECTING INTRUSION IN SCADA: EXPERIMENT
AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS We developed our classification scripts with Scikit-learn 1 , TensorFlow 2 and Keras 3 . Our source code is available on GitHub [14] . In the following, we evaluate our test results, together with the performance results of SVM and RF for anomaly detection using the gas pipeline system data set.
A. Anomaly Detection Results
We split each of the sixteen data sets into training, validation and test sets according to the division in Section III-B. Once we obtain the best configuration for a given classifier, the validation set is combined with the training set, leaving the final split into 80% of the observations in training set and 20% in the testing set. Two classifiers were used to study the performance of the different SVM, and RF-based IDS models: binary (normal, anomaly) and categorical (see attacks listed in Table I ). We denote these respectively by "BIN" and "CAT". For each experiment, we compared the performance of each ML technique under mean-standard deviation (MEAN) and min-max (MIN-MAX) approaches. Figures 2a, 2d , 2g, and 2j show the performance of SVMs for the binary and categorical classifier and for the MEAN and MIN-MAX data normalization. As we can see, the BIN classifier achieves a better F 1 score in both cases of data normalization (MEAN and MIN-MAX) using the Keep prior value. Indeed, the lowest F 1 score for binary classification is 92.04% (see Figure 2g ) while for CAT classification this value drops to 88.45 % (see Figure 2(j) ). The worst performance in terms of F 1 score for both classifiers was obtained by GMM and K-means algorithms. The Zeros & Indicators method performs better that GMM but worse than Keep prior value. For both binary and categorical classifiers, the MEAN normalization strategy outperforms MIN-MAX normalization. Table III summarizes the results, highlighting the best for BIN and CAT SVM classifiers employing the split criterion of 80% for the training set and 20% for the test set, and using the hyperparameters that gave us the best performance. We obtained a F 1 score of 94.34% for BIN and a F 1 score of 92.50% for the CAT classifier. These were achieved using MEAN normalization and keep the prior existing value strategy respectively to deal with missing values. 2) RF Performance: Figures 2b, 2e, 2h , and 2k present the contrasting configurations in a binary and categorical classifier modelled with the RF algorithm. The highest F 1 score was achieved by the binary classifier: 99.40% with MIN-MAX technique for data normalization and using the Keep prior value approach for dealing with missing data.
1) SVM Performance:
Table IV depicts the final results obtained using the best hyperparameters, and the 80%-20% split criterion, for the training and test sets. We obtained a F 1 score of 99.58% for BIN and a F 1 score of 99.41% for CAT. It is worth mentioning that for the final results, the difference between MEAN and MIN-MAX normalization strategies is very small: as illustrated in Table IV , the difference is 0.02% for binary classification and 0.03% for categorical classification. Therefore, similar results can be achieved with both normalization strategies. 
3) Results Analysis:
The results from RF, which are listed in Table VI show that it correctly classifies large numbers of normal and malicious packets. The categorical classification report in Table V shows the detection rate for each of the data type. The distinction between Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI) and Naive Malicious Response Injection (NMRI) presents low recall value. This is due to the randomness of NMRI attacks, which are likely to overlap in values with the CMRI attacks and normal data: since a CMRI attack consists of designing malicious packets that imitate normal behaviours, some of these overlap with normal packets. For a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, the cause for the low detection rate, in comparison with the rest of attacks, is due to the bad Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) attack. This attack injects an invalid CRC value in a write multiple register command, which makes the RTU to disregard the command, in turn causing a DoS. Random Forest algorithm was able to accurately classify the write command with the incorrect CRC value as an attack, but some responses from the RTU were not classified as a DoS attack. V. RELATED WORK The SCADA systems were originally designed following the air gap principle and therefore without security measures in mind [1] . Nowadays, these systems are in the spotlight of network attacks, due to standardization and connectivity to the Internet [2] . While using ML for predicting anomalies in networks has motivated many studies, little research has tackled the advantage of using ML in SCADA systems by using real data sets and a varied set of ML algorithms. In the literature, a large number of studies used the Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) 99 data set to evaluate their solutions for intrusion detection [15] - [18] . However, this data set does not consider the specificities of SCADA architecture, communication protocols and traffic patterns. Moreover, it is seen by the research community as biased, outdated, and not relevant for modern network attacks detection. In the following, we detail different intrusion detection approaches for SCADA systems using real data sets.
The authors of [19] combine the signature-based and modelbased approaches to design a rule-based IDS for SCADA networks. Their IDS overcomes the main disadvantage of signature-based systems, i.e only known attacks are detected using pre-established rules. In [20] , authors presented a multialgorithm model-based IDS. Models that represent the expected/acceptable system behaviour are created, and any behaviour that causes violations of these models is detected as an attack.
Both [21] and [22] presented an IDS that detects malicious network traffic in SCADA systems, based on One Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) technique. While authors of [21] use OCSVM to classify malicious observations by comparing them with benign ones, the study carried out in [22] aims at detecting intruders in SCADA networks by analysing variables of the control devices. Two different approaches of one-class classification, the Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) and the Kernel Principle Component Analysis (KPCA), were proposed as well in [23] . L p -norms are studied in Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernels for intrusion detection.
An IDS that detects SCADA attacks based on the network traffic behaviour was proposed in [24] . The IDS extracts the time correlation between different network packets and then monitors the system to determine if it is behaving normally or not. An alarm is raised when anomalies are detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
With growing demands for connectivity between the SCADA control network and the corporate network, novel network attacks have appeared as PLCs or RTUs devices are managed over IP communication protocols. In this paper, we have shown that ML techniques can detect network attacks against SCADA systems. We used a SCADA data set provided by the MSUs's in-house SCADA lab. We used SVM, and RF to implement diverse IDS classifiers. We provided a complete comparison between these algorithms along with the random hyper-parameter search results. We published our source code on GitHub [14] to help other researchers to verify, compare, and/or extend their studies. In contrast to the stateof-the-art studies, the use of the test set accuracy, precision, recall and F 1 score allowed us to assess their performance correctly and comprehensively. The RF algorithm gives the best performance by detecting 99.90% of benign data and 98.46% of attacks, with an overall detection rate (recall) of 99.58%.
